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TOO MUCH FOR A NATION TO BEAR: QUESTIONS 
OF SUSTAINABILITY AND CONSULTATION IN 




This case comment questions the neutrality of government environ-
mental assessment reviews in Canada, through an examination of the 
proposed Tulsequah Chief Mine in Northern BC. The author questions 
whether a government which openly promotes development can or will 
ever place sustainability of a region on an equal level with economic 
gains. In the case of the Tulsequah Chief mine, the Taku River Tlingit 
First Nation opposes the project on grounds of regional sustainability. 
The litigation between the Tlingits, the BC Government and the Redfern 
Mining Corporation has raised issues regarding the fiduciary duty of 
governments to considering the claims of first peoples as part of the de-
termination of sustainability for a region. Current government policies 
of ignoring cries for land claim settlements, while supporting incom-
plete development proposals, run contrary to the recommendations of 
the 1977 Berger Report of the MacKenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry. The 
author compares the costly, negative effects of hasty mine approvals 
to date, versus the commitment to sustainability demonstrated by set-
tling land claims and working with remote first nations as development 
partners. The author concludes that communities who will be affected 
by development must be able to accommodate the changes that develop-
ment will bring.
† The author is a third year student at Dalhousie University. This is her second published com-
ment in the Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies discussing issues of Aboriginal and Environ-
mental Law. Ms. Pugh will be returning to her home in the Yukon Territory to article and to 
practice law.
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DOES CONSULTATION PROVIDE THE POWER TO HALT PROJECT 
DEVELOPMENT?
Our history has shown, unfortunately all too well, that Canadaʼ’s 
Aboriginal peoples are justified in worrying about government 
objectives that may be superficially neutral but which constitute de 
facto threats to the existence of Aboriginal rights and interests.1
In March of 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada SCC) will hear argu-
ments by the Province of British Columbia in the matter of the Taku 
River Tlingit v. Tulsequah Chief Mine Project.2  Through a process initi-
ated by a lengthy environmental review, and extended by even lengthier 
litigation, the SCC will have the opportunity to render a decision on a 
matter of extreme importance to a First Nationʼ’s people prior to the 
development of a proposed project that stands to have immense impact 
on their way of life.  Given that all too often such issues are considered 
only after development or policies have already been implemented, the 
Court is in a unique position to provide a remedy beyond the platitudes 
that are often the only result of a courtʼ’s confirmation of Aboriginal 
rights. 
The Supreme Court will review the issue of whether governments 
have a duty to consult First Nations with respect to environmental as-
sessments in instances where no rights under section 35 of the Constitu-
tion Act have been established over the region in question, and where 
no treaties or land claims have been signed.3  Underlying the issue of 
consultation is the larger issue of what consultation really means in the 
context of the Canadian Environmental Assessment (EA) process, and 
whether the consultation process provides the public, particularly First 
Nations, any power to halt the development of proposed projects.  
The manner in which projects are assessed in British Columbia and 
other parts of Canada has been improving with respect to the dissemina-
tion of information to the public, and possibly through the institution 
of enhanced controls over the mitigation of adverse impacts resulting 
from project development. However, at a fundamental level, the assess-
1 R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49 at para. 64.
2 Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. Tulsequah Chief Mine Project, [2000] B.C.J. No.1301 (QL), 
2000 BCSC 1001; affʼ’d but varied [2002] B.C.J. No. 155 (QL), 2002 BCCA 59, leave to appeal 
to S.C.C.  requested, [Taku River (chambers) and Taku River (appeal), respectively].
3 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
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ment and consultation process continues to be fatally flawed and biased 
toward industry and development to the detriment of the overall sus-
tainability of the Canadian environment. In allowing for a consultation 
process that does not seem willing to contemplate the refusal of certifi-
cation of a proposed project, the neutrality of the assessment process is 
compromised and the meaning of consultation rings hollow.
Through an examination of the Tulsequah Chief Project, it becomes 
clear that current federal and provincial environmental assessment proc-
esses are driven by the premise that projects should be approved, pro-
vided that certain conditions are met.  Such a premise does not seek to 
inquire whether a project is appropriate for a region or an ecosystem; 
rather, it presumes that any and all concerns can be mitigated somewhere 
down the road.  If governments operate the assessment process with this 
level of deference to the viability of the project, consultation becomes, 
in effect, a way to identify concerns which may need to be mitigated, 
but not a way to review whether a project should proceed at all.  
The implication of this approach to assessment is that consultations 
bear more resemblance to disseminations of project information rather 
than an opportunity to review a project from a perspective that considers 
sustainability on par with other factors, as is mandated by provincial and 
federal environmental assessment legislation. Such meaningless consul-
tation undermines the very purpose of an environmental review.  
The Tulsequah Chief Mine is a recent, well-documented example of 
the fundamental error of treating consultation, particularly with respect 
to regional sustainability, as less weighty than other review standards. 
If the notion of sustainability is to continue as a hallmark of Canadian 
environmental assessment processes, governments must view meaning-
ful consultation as an essential part of the review process.
THE TULSEQUAH CHIEF PROJECT
1.  Location
The Tulsequah Chief mine site is located in the northwestern corner of 
British Columbia in the Taku River watershed. The Taku empties into 
the Pacific Ocean near Juneau, Alaska, approximately sixty-five kilom-
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eters (km) south of the mine.4 The watershed itself covers 18,000 square 
kilometers. Presently, there are no roads within the entire watershed 
with the exception of a small segment of the Golden Bear mine road in 
the southernmost portion of the area.5 The watershed has been described 
by many, including both the British Columbia Supreme Court (BCSC) 
and the British Columbia Court of Appeal (BCCA), as “pristine.”6
2.  History
The mine site itself is situated on a massive sulphide deposit original-
ly discovered in 1927.7 The site was developed in the early 1950s by 
Cominco Ltd. (now known as Teck Cominco). Cominco operated the 
Tulsequah Chief Mine for six years from 1951 to 1957. Gold ore was 
processed at a rate of approximately 450 tonnes per day. The ore was 
barged from the mine site to Juneau via the Taku River.8 The only access 
to the mine was, and still is, by air or water.
Cominco abandoned the mine in 1957. At that time, reclamation 
or site remediation were neither required nor expected for mining ac-
tivities. However, the process used to separate the ore resulted in the 
creation of tailing sites, from which acid mine drainage (AMD) seeped 
into the Tulsequah River.9 Cominco, who still owned the mine prop-
erty, was issued a pollution abatement order in 1989 when the AMD was 
discovered.  Instead of mitigating the problem as required by the or-
der, Cominco prepared a rehabilitation plan (resulting in a rescission of 
the order), and shortly thereafter sold the property to Redcorp Ventures 
Ltd., the parent company of Redfern Resources. Redcorp was then is-
4 Tom L. Green, “Evaluating Mining and its Effects on Sustainability: the case of the Tulsequah 
Chief Mine” (A Report Prepared for the Environmental Mining Council of British Columbia, 
July 28, 2001) at 4. [Peer-reviewed but unpublished].
5 Ibid.
6 Supra note 2.
7C. Sebert & T.J. Barrett, “Stratigraphy, alteration, and mineralization at the Tulsequah Chief 
massive sulphide deposit, northwestern BC” (excerpt from Exploration and Mining Geology, 
v.5, p.281-308, 1996) online: Ore Systems Consulting <http://www.oresystems.com/global/
tulsequahjourn.html>.
8 Taku River (chambers), supra note 2 at 6.
9 Environmental Mining Council of British Columbia, “Acid-Generating Mining Sites in Can-
ada, 2003” online:  Environmental Mining Council of British Columbia <http://emcbc.mining-
watch.org/emcbc/mapping/amd_canada.htm>.
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sued a pollution abatement order, but this was deferred in anticipation of 
a full environmental review of Redcorpʼ’s proposal to reopen the mine.10 
Redcorpʼ’s proposal included a rehabilitation plan for the historic tail-
ings and AMD.11
3. Redfernʼ’s Plan
As the new owner of the Tulsequah Chief property, Redfern Resources12 
proposes to reopen the mine with substantially higher daily production 
rates, a longer life-span and increased job opportunities through the 
construction, production and decommissioning phases of the mine.
Redfernʼ’s proposal is to mine approximately 2,500 tonnes of ore 
concentrate per day.13  At the time of Comincoʼ’s work on the mine, 
the daily ore mined was closer to 450 tonnes.  The substantial increase 
in tonnage and concern for disruption within the salmon-bearing Taku 
River makes the transport of ore by barge less feasible and less desirable 
from the perspective of most of the interested parties. Instead, Redfern 
proposed to build a single-lane, gravel road between the mine site and 
Atlin, B.C., a town 160 km north of the mine. The proposal involves re-
stricting the road to mine operations only by use of a twenty-four hour, 
monitored gate.14
From Atlin, the ore trucks will then travel a further eighty km along 
the Atlin Road, a dirt and gravel road connecting the isolated town with 
the Alaska Highway in the Yukon Territory. The ore will be transported 
seventy-five km along the Alaska Highway into the Yukon Territory, 
and then 160 km on the South Klondike Highway to the port town of 
10 Green, supra note 4 at 5-6. 
11 Supra note 2, appeal judgment, Appendix B, Schedule A.
12 While Redcorp Resources is the parent company who actually purchased the mine property 
from Cominco, it is junior mining company Redfern Resources who has proposed the project 
and undergone the environmental assessment process. Therefore, Redfern will be referred to as 
owner and proponent of the Tulsequah Chief Project within the remainder of this paper.
13 Taku River (chambers), supra note 2 at 2. 
14 See Redfern Project Report, infra note 45; Green, supra note 4; Lindsay Staples, “Determin-
ing the Impact of the Tulsequah Chief Mine Project on the Traditional Land Use of the Taku 
River First Nation,” (A Report prepared for the Environmental Assessment Office, Province of 
British Columbia, August, 1997) [unpublished]. 
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Skagway, Alaska.15 Beyond the construction of the 160 km access road, 
the Atlin Road will also require substantial upgrading involving im-
provement of the road surface in order to accommodate the weight and 
frequency of the ore trucks.16
4.  Quantities and Economics
Redfern Resources predicts that the mine would be redeveloped as a 
“medium-sized underground operation processing up to 900,000 metric 
tonnes (1 million tons) of ore per year.”17 A potential exists for the mine 
to be expanded and developed further as it deepens and new access 
routes are created. On top of the life-span of the mine, there would be 
an additional two years of pre-production development involving the set 
up of on-site infrastructure and road-building.	
    18 
An estimated 700,000 person hours of employment would be cre-
ated annually through the project. This translates into a construction 
work force of close to 400 during the construction phase, and approxi-
mately 200 on-site employees during the operations phase.19 Redfern 
anticipates that the available jobs will be filled by workers from Atlin, 
the Yukon, and elsewhere in British Columbia.  The Taku River Tlingit 
First Nation (TRTFN) may make up ten percent, or twenty jobs, within 
this workforce.20  Overall, the Staples Report provided to the British 
Columbia Environmental Assessment Office suggests that as many as 
600 direct, indirect, and induced employment opportunities may be cre-
ated through the mine.  Such estimates are questionable; Green notes 
that within a project of relatively short time frame such as this, these 
15 “Exploration in B.C. 1996” (Publication of BC Ministry of Energy and Mines) online:  Min-
istry Programs and Services.
<http://www.em.gov.bc.ca/Mining/Geolsurv/Publications/expl_bc/1996/northWest05.htm>.
16 This portion of the proposal has caused concerns for Yukoners, as well.  See Adam Killick, 
“Atlin Mine may cost Yukon Big Bucks” Yukon News (20 March, 1998). The cost of the upgrad-
ing may be in the range of $14 million.
17 Statement of Terence E. Chandler, President, CEO and Director, Redfern Resources Lim-
ited, (Witness Statement to the US House of Representatives Committee on Resources, May 
23, 2000) online: Committee on Resources <http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/106cong/
fullcomm/00may23/chandler.htm>.
18 Ibid.
19 Green, supra note 4 at 6.
20 Staples, supra note 14.
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estimates tend to be higher than what may actually be viable.21 Particu-
larly where training or skills are required, it is not clear that within the 
available workforce of the TRTFN, or even within the numbers of unem-
ployed in northern B.C. and the Yukon, such skills already exist.  No 
estimates for training, in terms of time or cost, appear to be included in 
the employment projections.
The numbers cited by Redfern for employment figures and projected 
incomes from taxation and indirect business creation are questionable to 
some extent; however, it is clear that the mine would create a substantial 
number of jobs and would contribute significantly to the economy of 
Atlin. What is less clear is whether such a contribution is necessary or 
desirable for such a remote area where many residents may ascribe less 
value to profits and monetary gains. There is evidence from public con-
sultation and the current tourism-based industry in the Atlin area that 
locals may place a higher value on current attributes of the Atlin region, 
such as social and cultural considerations, sustainability of the regionʼ’s 
wilderness, strong fish and animal populations, biological diversity and 
low human density than on economic considerations. Concerns have 
been raised in this regard by the TRTFN.  
The concerns noted by the TRTFN are not new, and they echo senti-
ments of other First Nations in northern Canada as far back as 1977 dur-
ing the Berger Inquiry into the proposed MacKenzie Gas Pipeline:
Any major development that has taken place in the North has been 
of a rapid nature. Their [white peopleʼ’s] only purpose in coming 
here is to extract the non-renewable resources, not to the benefit of 
northerners, but of …southern Canadians and Americans. [I]t does 
not leave any permanent jobs for people who make the North their 
home…they also impose on the northern people their white culture 
and all its value systems, which leaves nothing to the people who 
have been living off the land for thousands of years.22
Such sentiments are clearly not unique; indeed, they form the crux of 
the argument for recognizing sustainability as a key factor in the en-
vironmental assessment process. But in the thirty-five years since the 
21 Green, supra note 4 at 52.
22 Justice Thomas R. Berger, Northern Frontier Northern Homeland: The Report of the Mac-
Kenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, vol. 1.(Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1977) at 36 
[Berger Inquiry].
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Berger Inquiry, governments are still unwilling or unable to give such 
sentiments the consideration they are due.      
THE POSITION OF THE TRTFN
1. Background
Historically, the Taku River Tlingit (TRT) were known as the Takuquan, 
one of fourteen Tlingit clans based on the southeastern Alaskan Coast. 
The TRT are closely associated culturally, geographically and familially 
with Teslin Tlingit and Carcross-Tagish – two Inland Tlingit Nations 
with communities located predominantly in the Yukon.23  The Taku 
River Tlingit First Nation identify a traditional territory which spans 
much of the northwestern corner of British Columbia, as well as south-
ern portions of the Yukon and parts of southeastern Alaska. Of the ap-
proximately 300 Taku River Tlingit people, close to half live within 
the Atlin area.24  Many of the TRTFN who do not reside in Atlin live in 
Whitehorse and still closely identify the Atlin area as being culturally 
and personally important. Studies indicate that many TRTFN living away 
from Atlin do so because of economic or social necessity.25  Examples 
of this include families with teenaged children moving to Whitehorse so 
the children can attend high school, or elders who move in order to be 
closer to medical resources such as continuing care homes and hospital 
facilities.  
As noted by Staples, the relationships between the Inland Tlingit 
in B.C. and the Yukon have been complicated by the imposition of the 
B.C.-Yukon border and the subsequent creation of two different systems 
of governance within which the Inland Tlingit people must now oper-
ate. Over the past two decades, differential treatment of First Nations 
on the border has increased due to the successful efforts of the federal 
government to recognize land claims and allow for self-governance in 
the Yukon, while the British Columbia and federal governments have 
23 Staples, supra note 14 at 4.3.
24 Staples, supra note 14 at 4.3.
25 Staples, supra note 14 at 4.3.
26 Staples, supra note 14 at 4.3.
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shown reluctance and imposed delays in implementing a land claims 
and treaty process in the province.26
2. Traditional Uses of the Region
While the Taku River Tlingit are no longer entirely reliant on hunting, 
harvesting and gathering, reports and personal testimonies indicate that 
members of the TRTFN, whether resident or non-resident in Atlin, con-
tinue to pursue these traditional activities.27 
In a study of twenty-two TRTFN households, only three indicated that 
they did not participate in annual harvesting activities in the Atlin area.28 
Staples characterizes the interplay between the cash economy and har-
vesting activities in terms of economics as:
[A] sector that can be severed from the bush sector only with great 
practical and analytical difficulty. To do so diminishes the strategies 
of mutual aid and social and economic cooperation which tie the 
two together and which make TRT traditional land use the social and 
economic bedrock of the TRT economy.29
One of the primary resources harvested by the TRTFN is salmon from the 
Taku River. Such harvesting occurs throughout the summer, beginning 
with the king (or spring) salmon runs in June and July. The main sock-
eye salmon run occurs in July and August. This run provides both sub-
sistence and commercial harvesting to the TRTFN economy.	
    30 The mine 
site is located in close proximity to the source waters of the Taku River, 
creating a potential threat to the largest salmon run north of the Skeena 
River.31
Also of dietary and cultural significance are moose and caribou. 
While it is noted by Staples that moose comprise the majority of the 
TRTFN subsistence diet, this belies the historical importance of caribou 
to the TRTFN and the trans-boundary efforts to recover populations of 
27 Staples, supra note 14 at 4.3.
28 Staples, supra note 14 at 4.3.
29 Staples, supra note 14 at 4.3.
30 Salmon are a vital part of the TRTFN diet, second in kilogram consumption to moose, at 
seventy kg per household per year, out of approximately 296 kg per household per year. See 
e.g. Staples.
31 Green, supra note 4 at 4.
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caribou in the Taku River watershed region.	
    32 The TRTFN and caribou 
biologists are concerned that the incursion of the Tulsequah Chief road 
into prime habitat for the caribou may reverse what is seen by many as 
a fragile, yet thus far successful, process of bringing the herd back to 
sustainable levels.33
3.  Sustainability and Continuity
It is clear from studies, starting with the Berger Inquiry34 and leading 
up to work with the Southern Lakes, Rancheria, Finlayson, Fortymile 
and Porcupine-Caribou herds in the Yukon, that there is a correlation 
between road networks and disruption of caribou migration patterns.35 
It is also clear that where roads and development increase access to an 
area, traditional activities and reliance on land-based food sources drop, 
to the detriment of the health and economic viability of small, predomi-
nantly Native communities.36  
Such a finding does not suggest that development in First Nationsʼ’ 
traditional territories should not occur, but that it should occur with the 
endorsement of those affected, and at a pace which allows the First Na-
tion to have infrastructure in place to both preserve a way of life for 
future generations and to benefit from the effects the community will 
experience. As noted in the Berger report, if development occurs before 
native claims are settled: 
[T]he communities that are already struggling with the negative 
effects of industrial development will be still further demoralized.  
To the extent that the process of marginalization – the sense of being 
made irrelevant in your own land – is a principal cause of social 
32 The construction of the Alaska Highway in the 1940s led to unprecedented levels of over 
hunting and massive kills of caribou from the southern Yukon and northern B.C.  The Yukon 
currently has a program underway to restore populations of caribou to the northwestern B.C./
Southern Lakes area of the Yukon.  Therefore, while currently not of significance to the TRTFN 
diet, caribou are considered culturally significant to the TRTFN.
33 Concerns of the Southern Lakes Caribou Recovery Program in Killick, supra note 16.
34 Supra note 22.
35 See, e.g. Theresa Earle, “Thresholds and Caribou” (Your Yukon newsletter, column 322) on-
line: <http://www.taiga.net/yourYukon/col322.html>.
36 Supra note 22 at 148 “The Fort Simpson Experience”.
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pathology, the native people will suffer its effects in ever greater 
measure.37
The chief recommendation of the Berger inquiry was that in order to 
avoid this social pathology, credence must be given to the concerns 
raised by First Nations communities with respect to the rate of develop-
ment and the impacts that it may have.38 The Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act purports to provide an avenue for reviewing such con-
cerns through the commitment to sustainability as a key focus of the as-
sessment process. However, time and again, discussions of the impacts 
a project may have on the sustainability of a region and its people fall 
short of consideration of sustainability as an equal to economics. As 
such, the purported neutrality of the assessment process resembles a 
rubber-stamping procedure in favour of project proponents rather than 
an unbiased review of all the information at hand.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT PROCESS
1. The Committee
In 1994, Redfern Resources initiated an environmental review under 
the Mine Development Assessment Process, British Columbia (MDAP).39 
Simultaneously, the project also began the screening process of the 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA).40 British Columbia 
passed its Environmental Assessment Act (BCEAA) in 1996, which then 
removed the process from MDAP, and placed the project proposal under 
the BCEAA.41  
37 Supra note 22 at 194.
38 Supra note 22.
39 Redfern Resources Ltd.  “Tulsequah Project” (2003 Environmental Assessment Update)  on-
line:  Redfern Resources Ltd. – Official Website <http://www.redfern.bc.ca/projects/tulsequah/
permitting.html>
40 S.C. 1992, c.37. [CEAA].
41 S.B.C. 2002, c. 43.  At the time of the Environmental Assessment of the Redfern Project Pro-
posal, the Act in Force was the Environmental Assessment Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 119.  However, 
the certificate approval process under the two acts remains substantially similar. [BCEAA].
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Under the BCEAA, a major project such as the Tulsequah Chief Pro-
posal is reviewed in order to receive a Certificate of Project Approval.42 
The federal Environmental Assessment Act is subsumed by the BCEAA 
due to an initiative on the part of the two governments to streamline 
assessment processes into one large-scale assessment.43 In the case of 
the Tulsequah Chief Mine, the British Columbia Environmental Assess-
ment Office (EAO) convened a Project Committee to review the proposed 
reopening of the mine.
The Committee was established in accordance with section 30(1) of 
the BCEAA in force at the time. The purpose of the Committee, as noted 
by Kirkpatrick J., was to provide advice and recommendations to the 
executive director (at the time, Norm Ringstad) and the Minister of the 
Environment. Originally, the Committee was intended to review the in-
formation provided by Redfern as the project proponent. However, as 
the environmental review continued onward, it is clear from the records 
that the Project Committee ultimately played a far larger role in the 
creation of reports, dissemination of information, and the overall scope 
and parameters of the proposed project.44 
2.  The Reports
Redfern Resources provided its initial project study report in November 
of 1996.45 Initially, the TRTFN had agreed in principle to assist the pro-
ponent in the compilation of data, including use of maps and imagery, 
42 Ibid. s. 17(3).
43 CEAA, supra note 40, s.54.  However, subsequent to the court decisions and ongoing litiga-
tion with respect to the Tulsequah Chief Project, the CEAA has been restarted.  The Department 
of Indian and Northern Affairs (DIAND) has stated:  “Currently, DFO and DIAND are wait-
ing for a response to deficiencies from the proponent. At this point DFO and DIAND assume 
the review will be “de-harmonized” with independent decisions by the Federal and Provincial 
Governments.” (CEAA Level II Projects – Yukon Region, October 2002) online:  <http://www.
ainc-inac.gc.ca/yt/ceaa2_e.html>.
44 See Taku River (chambers), supra note 2 at 115.  Though the Court declined to find a rea-
sonable apprehension of bias in this process, Kirkpatrick J. did recognize that members of the 
Project Committee (including employees of the B.C. Government) did engage in improving and 
submitting mitigation proposals to the rest of the Committee.
45 This report will be referred to as the Redfern Project Report.  The report is no longer made 
available by the proponent or the B.C. EAO.  Therefore, any reference to this report is in the 
context of references made by the authors of other reports and commentary, as well as the judg-
ments in the B.C. courts.
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already completed in anticipation of ongoing land claim negotiations 
with the British Columbia government. However, the TRTFN entered into 
this endeavour with clear concerns about the impacts a road could have 
on their traditional territory and uses of the land, as well as adverse ef-
fects on wildlife and fisheries in the region. With that in mind, the TRTFN 
requested that further studies be undertaken in order to develop a better 
sense of the magnitude of the impacts the area might experience. Fur-
ther, the First Nation asked that the project be assessed by the proponent 
in terms of sustainability of the cultural and economic interests that the 
TRTFN had in the area.  
The TRTFN claim that such an in-depth analysis, though necessary in 
order to complete a full impact review, was not undertaken by the propo-
nent. When this deficiency was perceived, the TRTFN partially withdrew 
from the process with the proponent and requested that their position 
with respect to the Review Committee be upgraded from that of an ob-
server to a Committee member. The TRTFN stated that they were placed 
in, “an awkward position – we were being asked by the company to 
support a project for which we had no meaningful understanding of its 
significance to our people.”46 In other words, the TRTFN did not receive 
meaningful consultation by the proponent in its environmental impact 
assessment, and the First Nation now wanted to fully join the consulta-
tion process of the government as well.
Gaining a place on the Committee allowed the TRTFN to have a direct 
voice. It is worth noting, too, that in placing the TRTFN on the Project 
Committee, the British Columbia Government implicitly recognized its 
duty to consult the TRTFN above and beyond the consultations with the 
proponent. As members of the Project Committee, the TRTFN raised its 
continuing concern that the Redfern Project Report failed to adequately 
address its questions and concerns. In response, the EAO also tendered 
a review with a contractor agreed to by the TRTFN of the social, cultural, 
economic, and environmental issues.47 The report that was borne out of 
this second review process, the Staples Report, appears to align itself 
much more closely with the issues surrounding the adverse impacts of 
the mine on sustainability of the region in respect of the TRTFN interests 
in the traditional and cultural values of the land.
46 Staples, supra note 14 (introduction).
47 Taku River (chambers), supra note 2 at 59.
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It was the position of the TRTFN that, upon completion of the first 
Staples report but prior to its review, the First Nation was, “sufficiently 
aware of its design and direction to give it support as meeting the report 
specifications,” and that they hoped, “readers, in their pursuit of a better 
and more holistic understanding of the project, will treat [it] as the sub-
stantive assessment of impacts to our people.” The TRTFN also expressed 
hope that, “Redfern too, despite its initial antagonism to this study, will 
view it as the legitimate expression of concerns that Taku Tlingit people 
have with respect to the Tulsequah Chief Project.”48
Ultimately, however, the TRTFN did not feel that the Staples Report 
responded to all the concerns they had raised, and the government con-
tracted again to receive an addendum to the Staples Report that thor-
oughly canvassed the concerns the Tlingit had raised.49 By the end of the 
report generating process, the Project Committee had in its possession 
the Redfern Project Report, an Addendum to this report, the Staples 
report, the Staples Addendum, and an earlier, initial report prepared be-
fore the Project Committee was struck.
From this information, the EAO, as a member of the Project Commit-
tee, compiled a Recommendations Report to submit to the Minister for 
final determination of the certificate approval. While the Recommenda-
tions Report listed the group members, including the TRTFN, the Report 
itself failed to ever use the term “sustainability” and did not clearly 
iterate the concerns articulated by both the TRTFN and the government-
contracted Staples Report.50 It further failed to elaborate on the concerns 
raised by the United States with respect to trans-boundary issues, includ-
ing the threat by Governor Tony Knowles to refer the proposal to the 
International Joint Commission.51 The Project Committee did not meet 
48 Supra note 46.
49 Lindsay Staples, “Determining the Impact of the Tulsequah Chief Mine Project on the Tra-
ditional Land Use of the Taku River Tlingit First Nation,” (A Report Prepared for the Envi-
ronmental Assessment Office, Province of British Columbia, December, 1997) [unpublished] 
[Staples Addendum].
50 Finding of Kirkpatrick J., Taku River (chambers), supra note 2 at 58.
51 Office of the Governor, “Alaskans Meet with Canadians on Tulsequah Chief Mine:  Joint 
Watershed Planning, Protecting the Taku River Fishery on Agenda” (Press Release, Alaska De-
partment of Fish and Game, June 12, 2000) online:  Alaska Department of Fish and Game 
<http://www.state.ak.us/adfg/geninfo/press/2000/6-12gov.htm>.  Given the concerns with re-
spect to impacts on the salmon fishery, the Alaskan Governor had suggested a referral to the IJC 
in 1998, when the certificate was issued.  
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after the submission of the Staples Addendum in December of 1997. On 
March 2nd, 1998 the EAO announced the release of the Recommendations 
Report for review by the Project Committee, and gave a forty-eight hour 
time frame for comment. The report was submitted to the Minister on 
March 4, 1998 with a recommendation that the certificate be approved. 
The report provided all the prior reports as backgrounders, but did not 
go into detail with respect to the issues. 
3.  The Issue of the Certificate
It was the position of the TRTFN that while consultation had occurred, the 
termination of the review process made such consultation incomplete. 
The TRTFN claimed that submission of a Recommendations Report, which 
was unrepresentative of the concerns raised through the consultation, 
rendered the consultation process meaningless. Tony Pearse, who rep-
resented the TRTFN at Project Committee meetings, noted this perceived 
lack of representation in a letter to Norm Ringstad of the EAO:
How can the Project Committee, which has not ever met to deliber-
ate on the results of all the work undertaken by the various subcommit-
tees, complete its job properly when you allow only two days for review 
of a draft report the contents of which nobody has seen…There are, to 
my latest count, a number of issues still outstanding that are key to the 
viability of the project…The precedent being set here for the integrity 
of subsequent reviews is extremely dangerous. If the Project Committee 
never meets to discuss the review results and formulate a recommenda-
tion, what is the point of having one? How does this meet the stated 
intentions of the Environmental Assessment Act?52
The EAO record indicates that there was never a response to this 
query. In the face of this lack of response, the TRTFN submitted its own 
recommendations report with a summary of its stance on the issue: “the 
right recommendation is to reject the proposed project as being pre-
mature and too beset with information inadequacies, undetermined but 
significant environmental risk and naïve optimism about future manage-
ment capacity.  We so recommend.”53
52 Taku River (chambers), supra note 2 at 62.
53 Taku River (chambers), supra note 2 at 63.
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That the TRTFN was compelled to enter its own Recommendations 
Report in order to have its concerns included demonstrates the point at 
which this consultation process went wrong.  The following was noted 
by the BCSC:
The Tlingits do not argue that the sustainability of the Tlingits is the 
sole factor to be considered…The Tlingitsʼ’ point is that it is a factor that 
could not be ignored in the circumstances of this case. When the Tlingits 
called for more analysis, it was in the context of their argument that the 
issue of sustainability was not addressed either expressly, thoroughly, or 
in an integrated way by the Project Committee or in the Recommenda-
tions Report…The Tlingits thus argue that these were circumstances 
which the Ministers could not ignore.54
In its neglect of the issue of sustainability within the Recommenda-
tions Report to the Minister, the EAO committed the error discussed in 
the introduction to this paper: it did not demonstrate, through its actions, 
that the EAO provides a process that is neutral,  nor did it demonstrate a 
consideration of all factors enumerated under sections 2(a) and (b) of 
the 1996 Environmental Assessment Act, which reads:55  
2. The purposes of this Act are (a) to promote sustainability by 
protecting the environment and fostering a sound economy and 
social well-being, (b) to provide for the thorough, timely and 
integrated assessment of the environmental, economic, social, 
cultural, heritage and health effects of reviewable projects.
Upon receipt of the Recommendations Report, the Minister issued the 
Certificate of Project Approval to Redfern Resources within two weeks, 
with no written reasoning beyond three brief paragraphs.56 This decision 
was met with outrage from the TRTFN and many non-Native citizens of 
Atlin.  Concerns were also expressed by the State of Alaska and various 
environmental groups. The TRTFN then applied to the BCSC for a judicial 
review of the environmental review process and issue of the Project Ap-
proval Certificate, pursuant to the Judicial Review Procedure Act.57         
54 Taku River (chambers), supra note 2 at 66.
55 R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 119.
56 Taku River (chambers), supra note 2 at 33.
57 R.S.B.C. 1996, c.241 Named as respondents in the application were the EAO, the Minister of 
Environment, Lands and Parks, the Minister of Energy and Mines, the Minister Responsible for 
Northern Development, and the proponent, Redfern Resources.
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THE LITIGATION
1. British Columbia Chambers – Justice Kirkpatrick
The litigation of this matter proceeded first in the form of a Chambers 
hearing before Justice Kirkpatrick. The ten-day hearing resulted in the 
Ministersʼ’ decision being quashed and the matter being referred back 
to the Ministers for reconsideration after a revised Project Committee 
Report was submitted. While this was not the totality of the relief re-
quested by the TRTFN,58 the judgment did explicitly recognize the failure 
of the final stages of the Environmental Assessment Process – that of 
the formalization of the Recommendations Report, absent mention of 
sustainability and Tlingit perspectives, and the extraordinarily rapid de-
cision of the Ministers upon receipt of the Report.59 Justice Kirkpatrick 
stopped short of stating that “the entire process has been compromised 
or tainted,” but condemned the seemingly low value placed on the con-
cerns of the Tlingit by the Ministers in reaching their decision:  
I conclude that it cannot be said that there was no foundation in 
the evidence for the decision made by the Ministers. It can be said, 
however, that there was inadequate (and perhaps no) assessment of 
evidence produced by or on behalf of the Tlingits. In this respect, the 
decision was unreasonable.60
After issuing the chambers judgment of June 28, 2000 quashing the Cer-
tificate, Justice Kirkpatrick also issued a judgment of direction on July 
27, 2000 ordering that the reconsideration of the Environmental Assess-
ment Report and Recommendations follow specific steps. She ordered 
that the Project Committee be reconvened and provided with the Courtʼ’s 
reasons for decision, and that the Committee re-familiarize themselves 
with the issues. She further ordered that the Project Committee would 
meet to, “discuss and meaningfully address the concerns of the Taku 
River Tlingit First Nation regarding the Tulsequah Chief Mine access 
road and its impacts.”61 A revised draft recommendations report was to 
58 See Taku River (chambers), supra note 2 at 13.
59 Taku River (chambers), supra note 2 at 37.
60 Supra note 2 at 85.
61 Taku River (appeal), supra note 2 at 8.
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be developed and circulated for comment, followed by a final report 
(also to be circulated for comment), and finally the revised recommen-
dations report would be referred to the Ministers for decision. 
2. British Columbia Court of Appeal – Justice Rowles (Justice 
Southin in Dissent)
After the Chambers decision was handed down on June 28, 2000, a 
full two years after the provision of the initial Project Certificate, the 
British Columbia EAO and the proponent Redfern appealed the decision 
to the BCCA in September 2001.62 In the interim between the Chambers 
decision and the hearing at the BCCA, the parties agreed not to act on the 
order of Justice Kirkpatrick and await the outcome of the appeal.63
On appeal, the Court held two to one in favour of upholding the 
quashing of the Certificate. In dissent, Justice Southin embarks on a 
long discussion of why, in her opinion, the Court below was in error in 
finding the decision of the Ministers was made unreasonably. However, 
much of her justification for such a stance is derived through analogiz-
ing the First Nation to a municipality. As a point of administrative law, 
Justice Southin states: 
[I]t is right to consider these issues as if the objector was not 
Aboriginal but was a ʻ‘municipality in the vicinityʼ’…who objected 
to this mine and all its works on the ground that, in the opinion of 
the inhabitants, the economic benefits from a mine were less than 
the economic benefits from a nascent tourism industry which would 
not flourish, in their opinion, if the wilderness were invaded by 
monstrous trucks transporting ore to Atlin.64
Such a foundation for the substantive reasoning relating to the main is-
sue on appeal and cross-appeal (whether as a point of administrative law 
the Supreme Court erred in its determination of the powers and duties of 
ministers under the BCEAA) is fundamentally flawed. Justice Southin re-
moved the constitutional issues (the obligation to consult First Nations 
under section 35) from the key underlying issue of whether the consul-
tation, as it was done and then reported to the Ministers in the form of 
62 The TRTFN cross-appealed on this decision.
63 Taku River (appeal), supra note 2 at 8.
64 Supra note 2 at 16.
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the Recommendations Report, was in keeping with the objectives and 
requirements for a neutral, clear process under the BCEAA. Ultimately, 
Justice Southin opines that the actions of the British Columbia Govern-
ment cannot be construed as bias or a lack of neutrality:  
[W]hat happened in early 1998 bears a very different construction 
[from issuing a decision in a way that was not open, neutral or 
accountable]. This process had gone on and on at very considerable 
expense. It was clear that nothing short of changing the route of 
the road from the mine to Atlin would satisfy the Tlingit. They had 
made their points. The majority did not accept them. The executive 
director and the chairman of the committee had a duty…to bring 
the matter to an end and put the issue before the Ministers for their 
determination.65
This reasoning neglects to recognize the point the TRTFN had made from 
the outset: it is not that development within their region is unacceptable 
per se, but that without devoting the resources to developing a land use 
plan, settling land claims, acquiring baseline population data for species 
in the area, and for researching the potential scope of impact, rather than 
merely deferring to concepts of mitigation down the road, the British 
Columbia Government was not in fact exercising an open, neutral and 
accountable process that gave equal weight to sustainability and eco-
nomics considerations. The fact that Justice Southinʼ’s rationale harks 
back to the issue of economics for Redfern further emphasizes that the 
bias toward economic factors is pervasive throughout Canadian policy 
and judicial treatment of Aboriginal concerns.
Justice Southin also takes a perspective on the constitutional issue 
of section 35 rights that does not appear to fully consider the scope of 
what those rights may entail. While willing to concede that the TRTFN 
have some sort of rights in northwestern British Columbia, this conces-
sion stops short of recognizing those rights as having any  supremacy or 
effect on the outcome of ministerial decisions on environmental assess-
ments. Nor is Justice Southin prepared to consider whether the exist-
ence of section 35 requires governments to actively pursue resolution 
of those rights prior to or concurrent with allowing substantial develop-
ment within the areas at issue.  
65 Supra note 2 at 77.
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Ultimately, Justice Southin appears to liken section 35 rights to a 
right to voice an opinion, stating, “the right to be heard, whether in this 
or any other process, and no matter how great the issue, is not a right 
to victory.”66 Such comments only serve to illuminate the need for a 
clearer concept of meaningful consultation. If the combined effect of the 
BCEAA, CEAA and section 35 is to provide nothing more than an ability to 
present objections to development proposals, sustainability objectives 
are unlikely to be met and duties to consult resemble a one-sided proc-
ess of information dissemination. There are, and always will be, some 
projects which should be approved, but likewise, there are those which 
should be rejected or delayed until more is known. If rejection or delay 
is beyond the contemplation of government agencies, the neutrality of 
the review process is compromised for the parties who participate in the 
process in good faith, expecting that their concerns will be addressed.
The majority decision at the BCCA took a more holistic approach to 
the Tulsequah Chief dispute, framing the issue as whether Justice Kirk-
patrick erred in holding that the Ministers of the Crown were obliged 
to take into account the constitutional protection afforded to Aborigi-
nal rights by section 35 when determining whether to issue the Project 
Approval Certificate prior to the Tlingits having established any Abo-
riginal rights or title in relation to the area of the Tulsequah Chief Mine 
Project.67 Justice Rowles held that the obligation to consider Aboriginal 
rights under section 35 existed for the Crown under a legislative scheme 
such as the BCEAA and CEAA, even where no such rights have been estab-
lished by a First Nation. It is this issue, framed in this way, which is now 
before the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Appeal Court accepted the argument that where all experts 
within an assessment process have recognized that there is reliance by 
a First Nation on a system of land use, “merely identifying the problem 
is insufficient to meet the requirements of the EAA in that it does not ad-
dress solutions to the problem.”68 Specifically, the Court stated that Ab-
original rights may not be infringed by Crown-sanctioned activities,69 
and that arguments in which the constitutional or fiduciary obligation to 
66 Supra note 2 at 100.
67 Supra note 2 at 107.
68 Supra note 2 at 132.
69 Supra note 2 at 143-152.
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consult only arises on the determination of Aboriginal rights, “is wholly 
inconsistent” with Sparrow and Van der Peet.70
There were also arguments raised by the Crown with respect to the 
severance of the issue of the assertion of section 35 rights by the TRTFN. 
The Crown proposed that as the TRTFN had agreed to the severance of 
the determination of their land claim from the issue of the Tulsequah 
Project, there was no foundation on which the Chambers Judge could 
have considered the assertion of Aboriginal rights with respect to the 
consultations and duties on the Crown throughout the Tulsequah Chief 
Environmental Review. The Court noted that in this respect, the holding 
of the SCC in R. v. Sparrow provides some guidance:  
Section 35(1) suggests that while regulation affecting Aboriginal 
rights is not precluded, such regulation must be enacted according to 
a valid objective…By giving Aboriginal rights constitutional status 
and priority, Parliament and the provinces have sanctioned challenges 
to social and economic policy objectives embodied in legislation 
to the extent that Aboriginal rights are affected…The extent of 
legislative or regulatory impact on an existing Aboriginal right may 
be scrutinized so as to ensure recognition and affirmation.71
The question, as Justice Rowles saw it, was not whether the Chambers 
Judge should have considered the assertion of Aboriginal rights, but 
whether the concerns raised by the TRTFN had been addressed in sub-
stance with respect to the timing and scope of development of Redfernʼ’s 
mineral rights.72 Further, Justice Rowles found that the reasoning of the 
lower Court was clear and was supported by both the facts and jurispru-
dence.  
Ultimately, the British Columbia Court of Appeal recognized that 
“the Tlingits were willing to participate in [the EA process] in an appar-
ent effort to have their needs accommodated, but…the Certificate…was 
issued without their concerns having been met.”73 Thus, the BCCA upheld 
the lower Courtʼ’s ruling, though the Court dispensed with the require-
ment to refer the Recommendations Report back to the Project Com-
mittee.
70 Supra note 2 at 161.
71 Supra note 2 at 171.
72 Supra note 2 at 190.
73 Supra note 2 at 202.
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Upon receipt of the Court of Appeal ruling, the British Columbia 
Government appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court of Canada on the 
issue of the duty to consult prior to determination of the existence of 
Aboriginal or treaty rights for a First Nation. The matter is set for hear-
ing in March of 2004.  However, the question, as framed by the Crown, 
only partially addresses the concerns likely to be raised at that hearing 
on cross-appeal by the TRTFN.  What needs to be established, concur-
rently with a judgment on the obligation to consult, is what meaningful 
consultation truly means.
VI.  THE COST OF MINING AND THE COST OF OBLIGATIONS
1. Environmental Legacies: What is Past is Not Yet Over
In the assessment that took place in respect of the Tulsequah Chief 
Mine, neither the concerns regarding the road nor the initial assertion 
of Aboriginal rights were rebutted by the proponent or the government. 
Rather, the government and the proponent appeared to take these con-
cerns under advisement; and yet they did not act upon them. While it is 
reasonable that there are instances where concerns may not be sufficient 
to refuse certification to a project, in the case at hand there were obvi-
ous gaps in the information on which decisions were based.74 The Court 
recognized that members of the Project Committee assisted in develop-
ing mitigation measures for potential impacts.75 Instances such as these 
do not reflect a process that is inherently neutral, but instead a process 
which, as an end goal, will certify a project to go ahead. Added to this 
balance shift in favour of the proponent was the Recommendations Re-
port itself, wherein the EAO suggested that key issues such as wildlife 
impacts, decommissioning of the road, habitat depletion and regional 
land use planning were all potential adverse effects for which mitigation 
measures could be thoroughly developed at a later date.  
74 See comment at note 43.  See also Herb Klassen, Major Projects Review Unit, DFO: Letter to 
Terry Chandler, President, Redfern Resources (Subject:  Unresolved Issues Regarding Proposed 
Tulsequah Chief Project, 18 June 2002) online: <http://www.riverswithoutborders.org/DFOlet-
terREDCORP/DFOredfernletter.pdf >.
75 Supra note 44.
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The shortsightedness of such a recommendation is evidenced by 
numerous other mining developments where the concern for having 
clear mitigation measures are overlooked due to the pressures exerted 
on governments to create a “friendly climate” for development.76 Ulti-
mately, the rush to mine may result in incredible costs to the jurisdic-
tion that permits the development to go through. The Yukon Territory is 
struggling with several such examples: the Anvil Range Mine at Faro 
currently has a clean-up bill of over one hundred million dollars; and 
the cost of the Cantung Mine on the North West Territories-Yukon bor-
der may also become a public burden in the near future. In the North 
West Territories, the Giant Mine near Yellowknife may cost anywhere 
between seventy and nine hundred million dollars, depending on the 
difficulty in managing the arsenic contamination.77 These sites were de-
veloped at a time when mine controls were fewer; yet all were also al-
lowed to continue operations without remediation once the extent of the 
contamination was revealed. 
A more recent example of a lack of government foresight, in the 
context of CEAA, is the B.Y.G. Mt. Nansen Mine near Carmacks, Yu-
kon.78 Poised to spill cyanide tailings water into feeder streams of the 
Yukon River, a primary source of water for much of the territory and 
one of North Americaʼ’s major salmon bearing rivers, the B.Y.G. site, 
abandoned in 1999 when the company went into receivership, has cost 
the federal and territorial governments one point eight to two point two 
million dollars annually in interim remediation costs. The final clean up 
of the site is estimated at over six million dollars, which will be borne 
by Canadian taxpayers.79 At the time when the mine was developed it 
76 MiningWatch Canada, “Taxpayers to pay for massive clean-up at northern mines” (Article 
and Backgrounder, 2 September 1999) online: Canadian Arctic Resources Committee <http://
www.carc.org/whatsnew/cleanup.htm>.
77 Ibid.
78 R. v. B.Y.G. Natural Resources Inc., [1999] Y.J. No. 34 at 23 (QL)  (The corporation was given 
the maximum penalty of $200,000 – a far cry from the actual cost of remediation.  Lilles, Terr. 
Ct. J. noted that the corporationʼ’s actions, “demonstrate[d] an attitude consistent with ʻ‘raping 
and pillagingʼ’ the resources of the Yukon”). 
79 Yukon Ministry of Energy, Mines and Resources, “Type II Mines Sites Under the Devolution 
Transfer Agreement,” (Backgrounder, 15 July 2003) online:  Government of Yukon, 
<http://www.emr.gov.yk.ca/ Mining/Type2/PDF/backgrounder.pdf>.
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was billed as crucial to the continuance of mining in the territory.80 It 
stands now as an example of poor planning, unreasonable deference 
to proponent assessments, and a lack of accountability throughout all 
phases of the project.
2.  Voiseyʼ’s Bay and the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline: Timing and 
Sustainability
In contrast to projects such as B.Y.G. and the British Columbia Gov-
ernmentʼ’s handling of the Tulsequah Chief case, there are Canadian ex-
amples of meaningful consultation such as Voiseyʼ’s Bay in Labrador 
and the Mackenzie Valley pipeline project in the Northwest Territories. 
Both these projects were proposed several years ago, at times when First 
Nations in the respective regions were not prepared, had not completed 
land claims, and held concerns about the sustainability of the region if 
the project went ahead. While the specific facts of each proposal dif-
fered, the message sent by the Innu of Labrador and the Dene of the 
MacKenzie Valley was, on first consultation, that they were opposed to 
the project without more information and stability for their nations.
Such stability was created through the settling of land claims, the 
institution of self-government, and a place of equality within the proc-
ess of mine development.81 With these factors in place, both the Mac-
Kenzie Valley Pipeline and the Voiseyʼ’s Bay Nickel Project are in the 
initial stages of implementation. While there is, and likely always will 
be, some opposition to these projects, they are based on concrete re-
search, clear data with respect to wildlife populations, and anticipated 
impacts with clear plans for the mitigation of these impacts.82 The two 
80 The Yukon, as with many jurisdictions dependent on mining, suffered an economic downturn 
in the 1990s.  This is attributable in part to the lesser costs of production in developing nations 
and a reduction in base metal prices.  Companies and supporters of the mining industry also 
attribute the downturn in exploration to a “hostile” climate for mining, in part due to increased 
industry regulation and successful lobbying against projects such as the Windy Craggy mine in 
Northwestern B.C.
81 See R. Anthony Hodge, “Sustainability and the Proposed Tulsequah Chief Project” (A Back-
ground Paper Prepared for the British Columbia Environmental Assessment Office, May 2001) 
[unpublished] Appendix 1:  Greenʼ’s (1998) Voiseyʼ’s Bay Sustainability Test. [Hodge].
82 See e.g. Ben Olsen, M. MacDonald and A. Zimmer, “Co-management of Woodland Caribou in 
the Sahtu Settlement Area” (Workshop on Research, Traditional Knowledge, Conservation and 
Cumulative Impacts, Special Publication No. 1, Sahtu Renewable Resources Board, 2001). 
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projects stand as examples of initiatives which have been accepted by 
those directly impacted, at a time when the communities and the people 
involved had a greater capacity to participate in the projects and to ab-
sorb the changes the development would bring.83 
VII.  THE NEED FOR OUR NATION TO COMMIT TO 
SUSTAINABILITY
In 1977 Thomas Berger proposed a new way to deal with First Nations 
in the context of development within their traditional territories. He 
spent months collecting testimonies, often through interpreters, of how 
the people of the North perceived the impacts of development on their 
Nations and their way of life. The answers received clearly indicated 
that many Aboriginal communities were not ready for the changes such 
development would bring, and there were too many outstanding issues 
of land and self-government to consider development at that point.
Since Berger undertook the MacKenzie Pipeline Inquiry much has 
changed, but more has remained the same. The Canadian Constitution 
has enshrined the rights of Aboriginals, but courts are still attempting to 
articulate what the scope of those rights may be. Aboriginals in the ter-
ritories have settled claims with the Canadian Government, and many 
First Nations communities are now able to act with better certainty with 
respect to development proposals that may be put forth. Yet, many other 
First Nations, like the Taku River Tlingit, have yet to have their section 
35 rights recognized or have land claims settled with the British Co-
lumbia or federal governments. This lack of certainty creates a climate 
in which issues of sustainability can never be fully addressed, nor can 
companies hope to provide methods of mitigation that will satisfy the 
need for certainty that a First Nation may express.
It is possible in the Tulsequah Chief case that the concerns of the 
Tlingits are capable of being entirely mitigated. However, whether this 
is the case may never be clear because the Certificate was issued in a 
manner that breached the elements of good faith necessary to determine 
what positions all parties brought to the table. Without good faith in the 
83 Neither of these projects are without concern, but at this stage the potential gains, as viewed 
through Greenʼ’s “sustainability lens”, may now outweigh those concerns. Hodge, supra note 
81.
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process, parties to a dispute tend to polarize their stances in order to 
effect the best outcome for their position. In this case, once good faith 
was no longer present, the TRTFN moved toward litigation of the issue. 
That litigation is not over, and it would appear that the TRTFN, Redfern, 
and the B.C. EAO will be unable to resolve the question of sustainability 
until a court has determined the scope and duty of consultation within 
this process.
This is unfortunate because the proponent entered into the Envi-
ronmental Review with what was clearly good faith in the assessment 
process.84 While the scope of the project did not meet the sustainability 
assessment that the Tlingit required to provide their endorsement, the 
process was not at that point flawed; nor, was it flawed after the EAO con-
tracted a sustainability assessment separate to that of the proponent. The 
flaw in the assessment process occurred when the collaborative aspects 
of the Committee were halted, and the recommendations report was 
submitted—absent discussion of sustainability and absent discussion of 
the concerns of the TRTFN. This indicated that the government was go-
ing through the motions of consultation, but its meaning had been lost. 
The project would go ahead, regardless of opposition. The question of 
sustainability—of the Tlingits or the region itself, was no longer one 
that the government wanted answered in relation to the EA for the mine. 
This did a disservice to the proponent, in that Redfern is now party to 
the legal battle between the TRTFN and the British Columbia Government 
in which issues larger than one mine have been raised. It also did a dis-
service to the TRTFN, in that the question of their land claim has become 
so closely intertwined with the Redfern Mine that other aspects of their 
assertion of Aboriginal rights may be lost on grounds other than the 
strength of their claim. The Canadian public are also ill-served by the 
legal wrangling, given that they will bear the cost of a decade of assess-
ments and litigation—a cost which could outweigh the profits Canadi-
ans would see from the mine.
Currently in Canada we have an Environmental Assessment Process 
which could, theoretically, provide an excellent analysis of the potential 
impacts and benefits of a development project. From that analysis, de-
terminations could be made on whether a project ought to go ahead. But 
this is far from the reality borne out by the experiences of Redfern and 
84 As noted by Kirkpatrick J. in Taku River (chambers), supra note 2.
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the Taku River Tlingit. The British Columbia Government, by all ap-
pearances, committed to ensure that the development went ahead long 
before the assessment was completed. Some would say the assessment 
never was complete, regardless of the position of the B.C. EAO.  
With continuing examples of the poor application of principles of 
sustainability, such as the case of the Tulsequah Chief Mine, it is clear 
that the attitude of governments must change. It is harmful to industry, 
groups committed to principles of sustainability, and to the people of 
Canada to continue to see the CEAA and provincial assessment acts as 
simply approval processes and not as opportunities to evaluate whether 
a project really is in the best interests of Canadians. If we continue to 
approve projects without due consideration of the principles of sustain-
ability, there will be more incidents like the Tulsequah Chief Mine—
where the proponent, the government and opponents of the project are 
locked in a legal battle which may never provide a satisfactory answer 
to whether this mine should go ahead. Even bleaker is the potential for 
more situations like Mt. Nansen and the Giant Mine, where the propo-
nents are long gone and the taxpayers bear the burden of cleaning up a 
disaster which should never have occurred.  
There is a clear need for communities that will be affected by de-
velopment to be able to accommodate the changes that development 
will bring. Further, development must elevate rather than detract from 
a communityʼ’s overall sustainability. These were the findings of the 
Berger Inquiry, almost three decades ago. Principles of sustainability 
are now clearly mandated by federal and provincial legislation. Where 
sustainability is not in evidence, the burden rests on the government to 
maintain a position of neutrality which was intended to be a part of the 
assessment process. Without government neutrality, these matters will 
spend years in court, and uncertainty will continue to reign for industry, 
communities and First Nations affected by the proposed development. 
While a position of neutrality may, in some circumstances, require the 
delay or rejection of a project until questions of sustainability are an-
swered, the cost of taking such a position is one our nation must bear.
